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Abstract 
 
Our goal in this paper is to articulate a novel account of the ordinary concept ART. At 
the core of our account is the idea that a puzzle surrounding our thought and talk about art 
is best understood as just one instance of a far broader phenomenon. In particular, we 
claim that one can make progress on this puzzle by drawing on research from cognitive 
science on dual character concepts. Thus, we suggest that the very same sort of 
phenomenon that is associated with ART can also be found in a broad class of other dual 
character concepts, including SCIENTIST, CHRISTIAN, GANGSTER, and many others. Instead of 
focusing narrowly on the case of ART, we try to offer a more general account of these 
concepts and the puzzles to which they give rise. Then, drawing on the general theory, we 
introduce a series of hypotheses about art concepts, and put those hypotheses to the test in 
three experimental studies.  
 
 
 
Here is a fictional version of a conversation one might overhear in the Los 
Angeles County Museum of Art while standing in front of Jeff Koons’s Michael 
Jackson and Bubbles (1988): 
 
Alfie:  This is not art. I know many people think it is art, but 
when you think about what art really is, you will realize 
that it is not art at all. 
Betty: Of course this is art. It is in the Los Angeles County 
Museum of Art! 
Alfie: I know. But it’s impersonal factory-produced rubbish.1  
 
We think it is pretty obvious that this sort of conversation (or something very close 
to it) is commonplace. Contemporary art, especially the avant-garde, frequently 
generates public resistance. This resistance often leads to conversations like that 
between Alfie and Betty. These conversations, and their persistence, call for 
explanation.  
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of Vienna for their feedback. In addition, we thank Dominic McIver Lopes and many anonymous referees for their 
comments. This research was supported by a European Community FP7 Marie Curie International Incoming 
Fellowship, grant PIIF-GA-2012-328977. 
1 As art critic Jed Perl (2014) writes, ‘Everything Koons produces has a factory-produced impersonality’. 
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We want to know why disputes about the artistic status of various objects 
are so common. After all, people do not typically engage in similar debates about the 
vast majority of artifact categories. If we were to overhear Alfie and Betty engaging 
in a similar dispute about whether something was a washing machine or a clock 
radio we would likely think that they were joking or perhaps deeply confused. 
However, we do suspect this sort of conversation takes place with many other art 
categories. It would not surprise us to overhear Alfie and Betty having a very similar 
debate about whether or not Blink-182 is truly punk or whether Macklemore is truly 
hip-hop.  
Our goal in this paper is to articulate a novel account of the concept ART that 
helps to address this question.2 At the core of our account is the idea that the 
puzzling phenomenon associated with our thought and talk about art is best 
understood as just one instance of a far broader phenomenon, one that extends 
considerably beyond this domain. In particular, we try to make progress on this 
puzzle by drawing on a theory from cognitive science on dual character concepts. 
Thus, instead of focusing narrowly on the case of ART, we try to offer a more general 
account of these concepts and the puzzles to which they give rise. Then, drawing on 
the general account, we introduce a series of hypotheses about art concepts in 
particular and put those hypotheses to the test in three experimental studies.  
 
1. Accounts of ART 
 
Our aim is to develop an empirical theory about the structure of folk art concepts.3 
In this respect, our interest diverges from most aestheticians, who have been more 
interested in determining what art really is than in understanding the folk concept of 
art (Lopes 2014: 12–13). Nevertheless, the two endeavors are also not wholly 
disconnected from one another. In his presidential address to the American Society 
of Aesthetics, Kendall Walton remarked:  
 
… part of the job of aestheticians is to get a clear picture of the actual folk 
theories and concepts that our experiences and attitudes and activities 
involve. […] If we are to understand the thoughts and actions of the folk, 
we must characterize accurately the theories and concepts with which they 
are working, all warts included. (2007: 154–155) 
 
Since folk art concepts underlie actual artistic attitudes and activities, it would not be 
surprising that a better understanding of the structure of folk art concepts can 
indirectly aid aestheticians in their project of uncovering what art really is. In this 
spirit, Jeffrey Dean (2003) and Alessandro Pignocchi (2012) have independently 
                                               
2 Note on conventions: We will use small caps for concepts, italics for technical terms and emphasis, single quotes 
for linguistic items and quotations. 
3 Given that our study participants are located in the United States, our empirical theory only targets folk art 
concepts of Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies (Henrich et al. 2010). Even 
within this scope, we do not assume that everyone shares the same art concept; rather, we follow others in the 
philosophical literature who hold that there are generally, but perhaps not universally, shared concepts. 
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articulated ways in which cognitive scientific findings on concepts can constrain 
aestheticians’ theorizing about the nature of art and other artistic categories. 
In the same presidential address, Walton (2007: 151) also remarked that 
‘Adherents of the conceptual analysis view of philosophy might say that philosophers 
are especially or uniquely interested in our concepts. But why should the 
investigation of our concepts not be a job for empirical psychology?’ We think we 
can do both: our aim is to use the tools of empirical psychology to better theorize 
about the structures of concepts that aestheticians might be especially or uniquely 
interested in. Our starting point is the sophisticated literature that directly takes up 
questions about the concept of art. A good deal of this literature focuses on whether 
or not the concept is evaluative, descriptive, or both.4 
The descriptive account of ART says that there is a single non-evaluative 
concept of art. Richard Wollheim is, at least on one natural interpretation, a 
defender of the view that the only literal sense of art is a descriptive one. In response 
to those who claim that ‘art’ has a primary ‘classificatory’ sense as well as an 
‘evaluative’ sense and, perhaps, an ‘honorific’ one too, Wollheim reasons as follows: 
 
Senses of a term are not to be multiplied beyond necessity, and these 
examples fail to establish in the case of the term ‘art’ any such necessity. 
What they do show is that ‘art’ is often used idiomatically or in ways which 
cannot be understood simply on the basis of knowing its primary 
[classificatory] meaning. ... More specifically, the evaluative sense of ‘art’ 
can be explained as a case of ellipsis and the courtesy sense as a case of 
metaphor. The examples that the Institutionalists cite no more provide 
evidence for special senses of art than Mark Antony’s epitaph on Brutus 
(‘He was a man’) requires a special (presumably evaluative) sense of ‘man’, 
or Plautus’s judgment upon man (‘Man is a wolf to man’) calls for a special 
(presumably courtesy) sense of ‘wolf’. (Wollheim 1980: 159) 
 
In this short passage, Wollheim makes two important arguments. The first is a 
linguistic debunking argument. Wollheim says that we have no reason to think that 
the concept ART is evaluative because the appearance of evaluative uses of the term 
‘art’ can be explained away as non-standard uses that are not indicative of the 
concept that the term tracks. The second is a conceptual parsimony argument. 
Wollheim says that we should not posit multiple concepts, or ambiguous concepts, 
unless we have to. And the linguistic debunking argument is supposed to have 
shown that, for the concept ART, there is in fact no need to posit multiple senses 
associated with it. 
The evaluative account of ART says that there is a single evaluative concept of 
art, or—a bit less strongly—that there is a single ordinary or ‘folk’ concept of art 
which is evaluative. So, for example, Berys Gaut argues that that ‘only notion of ‘art’ 
                                               
4 We are focusing on what we shall call, for want of a better term, the artistic concept(s) of art. That there is a distinct 
non-artistic ‘skill’ or ‘techne’ concept of art (as in ‘the art of motorcycle maintenance’) is not in dispute. Since we are 
focusing on a puzzling phenomenon that goes beyond the concept ART, it is worth noting that analogous accounts 
can be found for other art concepts. For example, with LITERATURE, David Davies (2007: 1-3) gives an ambiguity 
account and Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugen Olsen (1994: 255) give an evaluative account. 
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is an evaluative one’ (2000: 39), and Alan Goldman suggests that ‘[i]f you are not a 
present-day philosopher, your very concept of art is probably evaluative’ (1995: 2). 
Ben Tilghman’s review of Goldman’s book claims that he ‘is surely right’ that the 
‘ordinary concept of art … is evaluative’ (1999: 81). Variants of this account differ in 
what the evaluative aspect of ART amounts to. Our focus is on arguably the most 
natural construal, which says ART essentially involves positive evaluation. So, for 
example, Goldman claims that the folk concept of art makes implicit reference to 
some sort of value or valuable experience (1995: 2). Tilghman says that ‘[t]o call 
something a work of art is to suggest it is worth contemplation’ (1999: 81). And 
Stanley Cavell asserts ‘that works of art are valuable is analytically true of them’ 
(1976: 216). As such, the terms associated with the concept, such as ‘art’, are 
essentially commendatory. To call an object ‘art’, on such a view, is to convey a 
positive evaluation of it.5 
Despite their obvious disagreement, evaluativists share the implicit 
assumption held by our arch-descriptivist, Wollheim. Gaut argues that there is no 
‘distinct, classificatory sense of “art”’ (2000: 39). Even more strongly, Matthew Rowe 
argues that ‘the “classificatory sense” of “art” does not fit our aesthetic practice and 
discourse’ and that ‘such a sense could not exist’ (1991: 221). In other words, these 
proponents of the evaluative account take showing the descriptive account and the 
ambiguity account to be mistaken to give support for the evaluative account. 
The ambiguity account of ART says that there are both descriptive and 
evaluative concepts of art. Morris Weitz provides a canonical statement of the view: 
‘As we actually use the concept, “art” is both descriptive (like “chair”) and evaluative 
(like “good”); i.e., we sometimes say, “This is a work of art,” to describe something 
and we sometimes say it to evaluate something. Neither use surprises anyone’ (1956: 
33). George Dickie agrees that there are both descriptive and evaluative senses of 
‘work of art’ (1997: 51), but in some of his work he distinguishes three senses: ‘the 
primary or classificatory sense, the secondary or derivative sense, and the evaluative’ 
(1974: 25).6 Many other authors, e.g., Shusterman (1984: 38), Telfer (1996: Ch. 3) 
and Anderson (2000: 83), articulate variants of the ambiguity account. 
For these ambiguity theorists, not only are the descriptive and evaluative 
concepts of art distinct, they are disconnected from one another.7 Weitz suggests 
                                               
5 Note that the positive evaluation need not be an all things considered positive evaluation. Catherine Abell gives a 
similar general characterization of the evaluative account: ‘Evaluative definitions of art pursue the projects of 
definition and of value elucidation simultaneously, by defining artworks as things with value of a certain kind. 
However, they have the undesirable consequence that to be art is necessarily to be good art.’ (2012: 671; our 
emphasis). But there also exist some evaluativists who are not positive evaluativists. Berys Gaut, for example, holds 
that the concept of art is evaluative in the sense that a ‘cluster of properties relevant to establishing something as art 
includes evaluative properties’ and, hence, although no positive evaluation or praise are necessarily involved in 
characterizing something as art, ‘the question of whether these good-making features are possessed is always relevant 
to the question of whether something is art’ (2000: 39). Our focus is not on this more sophisticated variant of the 
evaluative account, but we take our account to be relevant to its assessment since we ultimately offer evidence in 
favor of an alternative account of the concept of art.  
6 The ‘derivative sense’ is used, according to Dickie, when an object (e.g., a seashell) ‘has many properties in 
common’ with a paradigmatic work of art. 
7 Even linguists who grasp the abstract distinction admit that ambiguity and polysemy can be difficult to distinguish 
in practice. We use the term ‘ambiguity’ in order to emphasize that, on the ambiguity account, the descriptive and 
 
 5 
that while the descriptive concept merely describes, the evaluative concept ‘praises’ 
and includes ‘certain preferred properties or characteristics of art’ (1956: 34). 
Similarly, while Dickie suggests that the evaluative sense of ‘art’ is used when various 
properties of the object are ‘found to be valuable by the speaker’, he says that the 
classificatory sense of ‘art’ ‘indicates simply that a thing belongs to a certain category 
of artifacts’ (1974: 26). It is clear that both theorists take the relevant notion of 
evaluation involved in the evaluative concept of art to be positive evaluation. Using 
‘art’ in this sense is essentially linked to praise. In contrast, the descriptive or 
classificatory concept of art is understood by both theorists to lack this notion of 
evaluation. In other words, for ambiguity theorists, to go from one sense of ‘art’ to 
another sense of ‘art’ is to simply change the topic. 
Extant accounts of ART can explain the puzzling conversation between Alfie 
and Betty that we started with. But we claim that they offer unsatisfying 
explanations. A descriptivist might claim that Betty is right and Alfie is wrong 
because Koons’ work meets the descriptive criteria for being art. However, on this 
account, Alfie’s error is a straightforward consequence of the nature of ART. Alfie, 
then, suffers from conceptual confusion. Similarly, an evaluativist might hold that 
Alfie is right and Betty wrong because Koons’ work really is terrible, and that Betty’s 
error is a straightforward consequence of the nature of ART. Betty, then, suffers from 
conceptual confusion. Finally, on the ambiguity account, Alfie and Betty may both 
be right (or, for that matter, wrong), but they fail to recognize that they are talking 
past one another. Thus, all three standard approaches explain our initial puzzling 
conversation by appealing to one or both of the parties suffering from a fundamental 
misunderstanding about the concept(s) of art.  
All three standard approaches focus on variations in the content of the 
concept(s) of art in diagnosing the puzzling conversation. Consequently, they each 
offer an interpretation that is, we suggest, uncharitable to one or both of the parties 
in the conversation. We shall now argue that an alternative account—one that 
focuses on the structure of the concept(s) of art—can do better. 
 
2. Dual Character Concepts 
 
At the core of our hypothesis is the idea that the puzzling conversations found in the 
domain of art are just one instance of a far broader phenomenon. For an initial 
example, take the concept SCIENTIST. The same puzzling judgments we find with ART 
can be found with this concept as well. Indeed, one can easily imagine a conversation 
that would be highly analogous to the one with which we began.  
 
Alfie:  She is not a scientist. I know many people think she is a 
scientist, but when you think about what scientists really 
are, you will realize that she is not a scientist at all. 
                                               
evaluative concepts associated with the term ‘art’ are disconnected from one another. To preview, our own dual 
character account is importantly different from the ambiguity account in part because it posits two aspects of the 
concept ART that are connected to one another. 
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Betty: Of course she is a scientist. She is skilled at running 
experiments and publishing in scientific journals. 
Alfie:  That is not what I meant! What I meant is that she does 
not possess a genuine willingness to revise her beliefs in 
light of empirical evidence. 
 
Or take the concept CHRISTIAN. Here too, we can imagine an analogous dialogue.  
 
Alfie:  She is not a Christian. I know many people think she is a 
Christian, but when you think about what it really means 
to be a Christian, you will realize that she is not a 
Christian at all. 
Betty: Of course she is a Christian. She goes to church every 
week and believes that Jesus is the son of God. 
Alfie:  That is not what I meant! What I meant is that she does 
not show genuine compassion. 
 
It seems that we can now draw a quite general distinction between a whole class of 
concepts for which these patterns of judgment arise and another class of concepts for 
which they do not. In other words, we can pick out the concepts for which people 
make the kinds of judgments found in these dialogues (SCIENTIST, CHRISTIAN, 
SOLDIER) and distinguish them from concepts for which people would not make 
such judgments (CASHIER, WAITER, OPTICIAN). Concepts for which people do make 
these sorts of judgments have been referred to as dual character concepts (Del Pinal 
and Reuter 2017; Guo, Dweck, and Markman 2018; Knobe et al. 2013; Leslie 2015; 
Newman and Knobe in press; Tobia, Newman, and Knobe in press; building on 
Machery and Seppälä 2009; see Reuter 2019 for an overview). 
One of the most salient facts about dual character concepts generally is that 
each such concept appears to be associated with two distinct criteria.8 Many things 
will satisfy both criteria or neither, but there will also be cases in which a single thing 
satisfies one criterion but not the other. It is precisely this sort of case that one finds 
in the dialogues in the preceding section. In each dialogue, Alfie adopts one criterion 
and concludes that a person does not fall under the relevant concept, while Betty 
adopts another criterion and concludes that this same person does fall under the 
concept.  
The kind of criterion that Betty adopts in these dialogues does not seem to 
involve anything unique to dual character concepts. It seems to be a kind of criterion 
that one might also find for concepts of many other types. Following existing work 
in this area, we assume that these criteria are best understood in terms of a set of 
different descriptive features.9 For example, the concept SCIENTIST might be 
associated with descriptive features like running experiments and publishing in 
                                               
8 For simplicity, we will often speak of the descriptive features criterion and the characteristic values criterion. 
However, we in fact think that most concepts include multiple descriptive features criteria and multiple 
characteristic values criteria. So, for example, when we speak of the descriptive feature criterion, we really mean to 
pick out the cluster of descriptive features criteria, whatever they turn out to be. 
9 The existing literature on this topic is enormous and highly complex. For helpful reviews, see Murphy (2002) and 
Smith and Medin (1981). 
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scientific journals. Similarly, the concept CHRISTIAN might be associated with 
descriptive features like going to church and believing that Jesus is the son of God. 
There has already been a great deal of valuable research on how people use lists of 
features like these as criteria for concepts, and we will not be contributing anything 
new to the study of this topic here. In what follows, we will refer to this first criterion 
as the descriptive features criterion.  
By contrast, the kind of criterion that Alfie adopts in these dialogues seems 
to be more distinctive to dual character concepts in particular. In general, one can 
pick out this second criterion by adding the modifier ‘true’. Thus, Alfie could make it 
clear which criterion he is employing by saying something like ‘She is not a true 
scientist’ or ‘She is not a true Christian’. Our focus in what follows will be on 
judgments of this type. 
Note to begin with that this second criterion is very different from the 
familiar idea that certain people or objects count as ‘prototypical’ members of 
categories (as explored, e.g., in the work of Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Indeed, it often 
makes sense to say that a person fulfills this second criterion even when that person 
doesn’t even come close to being a prototypical category member. Consider a six-
year-old child who has rarely, if ever, gone to church and who has only the vaguest 
sense of who Jesus is. This child is clearly not the prototypical member of a category 
of Christians, but all the same, if she were to display a striking capacity for 
compassion or forgiveness, we might be inclined to say that ultimately it is her, and 
not the more prototypical category members, who should be seen as the best 
illustration of what it means to be a ‘true Christian’. 
So then, what exactly is involved in this second criterion? Broadly speaking, 
it seems in some way to involve values. However—and this point will be crucial in 
what follows—it does not seem to be simply a matter of whether something is good. 
As Del Pinal and Reuter (2017) have shown, people are perfectly willing to apply 
dual character concepts even to entities that they do not regard as straightforwardly 
good. To illustrate, consider a person who is unskilled with respect to all of the 
various descriptive features involved in being a scientist (unskilled at running 
experiments, unskilled at publishing in scientific journals, etc.). This person would 
certainly be lacking in something of value, but it would not be correct to say just for 
that reason that she did not fulfill the second criterion and was therefore not a ‘true 
scientist’. On the contrary, there might be cases in which we could hold up such a 
person as the very paradigm of what being a true scientist is all about. For example, 
suppose that a person was lacking in these various skills but that she nonetheless 
showed an extraordinary willingness to subject her beliefs to empirical scrutiny and 
to revise even her most cherished commitments in the light of empirical evidence. In 
such a case, we might acknowledge that she is not an especially good scientist, but it 
would still make perfect sense to say that she perfectly fulfills the second criterion on 
for the concept SCIENTIST. For example, we might pick this person out and say: 
‘When you think about what it really means to be a scientist, you would have to say 
that this person is a true scientist’. 
Within existing work on dual character concepts, one hypothesis is that the 
second criterion is to be understood not in terms of being good but rather in terms 
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of embodying certain characteristic values (Knobe et al. 2013). For example, in 
addition to whichever descriptive features we might associate with the concept 
SCIENTIST, we seem to associate this concept with some values (e.g., a commitment 
to revise one’s beliefs in light of empirical evidence). To the extent that a person 
embodies this value, she fulfills the second criterion and counts as a ‘true scientist’. 
Similarly, we might associate CHRISTIAN not only with various descriptive features 
but also with some values (e.g., compassion), and to the extent that a person 
embodies these values, she counts as a ‘true Christian’. We therefore refer to the 
second criterion for dual character concepts as the characteristic values criterion. 
Note that the question as to whether something fulfills the characteristic 
values criterion is deeply different from the question as to whether it is good. For 
example, to say that an individual is a ‘true Christian’ is not to say that she is a good 
human being; it is to say that she embodies the characteristic values of Christianity. 
Some people might believe that the characteristic values of Christianity are not good, 
or that they are not nearly as important as certain other values. Such people might 
think that a given individual does embody the characteristic values of Christianity 
but that she is still a terrible human being. The key point now is that one could not 
express such an opinion by saying: ‘She is not a true Christian’. In short, the 
characteristic values criterion is a matter of embodying the characteristic values 
associated with a particular concept rather than of being good per se. 
What is the relationship between descriptive features and characteristics 
values criteria? Within research on dual character concepts more broadly, it has been 
suggested that people pick out the values by in some way reflecting on the features. 
For example, one view is that people determine which values are associated with a 
particular concept by looking at the features associated with that concept and asking 
which values those features serve to realize (Knobe et al. 2013). If this more general 
view turns out to be correct, and if it applies also to the concept ART, we arrive at a 
different conception of the relationship between the two criteria associated with that 
concept. On the traditional ambiguity account, although the word ‘art’ can be used 
to express either a descriptive concept or an evaluative concept, those two concepts 
are disconnected from one another. Thus, when a person switches from the 
descriptive to the evaluative, she is basically just changing the topic. By contrast, on 
the dual character account, the two criteria are very closely related. When a person 
moves from the descriptive features criterion to the characteristic values criterion, 
she is not simply abandoning her previous topic and switching over to a different 
one. Rather, there is some important sense in which she is just reflecting more 
deeply on the significance of the very same descriptive features she had been 
considering before. 
  
3. Dual Character Account of ART 
 
Our hypothesis is that ART is a dual character concept. We therefore suggest that 
some of the puzzling conversations we find about whether or not a given artifact 
counts as a work of art are not best explained by positing something highly 
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distinctive about the concept ART in particular. Instead, they are best explained in 
terms of general facts about the structure of dual character concepts. 
This hypothesis yields a simple explanation of the dispute in the dialogue 
with which we began. Betty is relying on the features criterion, while Alfie is relying 
on the characteristic values criterion. Alfie’s claim is that the object does not count as 
a true work of art because it does not embody the characteristic values of art. In this 
sense, the dialogue is no different from the analogous disputes one might find using 
SCIENTIST, CHRISTIAN, or any other dual character concept. 
In the specific case of ART (and a select few other dual character concepts), 
there are certain additional factors that obscure this structure and make it especially 
difficult to understand the nature of the debate. The problem is simply that almost 
all people regard the characteristic values of ART as good. For this reason, one may 
initially be drawn to a hypothesis that is more or less unrelated to the framework 
developed in the previous section. Specifically, one may be drawn to the hypothesis 
that the evaluative criterion that sometimes guide people’s use of the concept ART are 
simply a matter of determining whether a given artifact is good. In other words, one 
may be drawn to the evaluative account of ART or the ambiguity account of ART, 
both of which say that ‘art’ can connote a positive evaluation.  
We will argue against this hypothesis. We suggest that the question as to 
whether an artifact is a ‘true work of art’ is not fundamentally different from the 
question as to whether a person is a ‘true Christian’ or even whether a person is a 
‘true gangster’. In all cases, we are asking whether an object embodies the 
characteristic values associated with the relevant concept. The only difference is that, 
in the case of art, it happens that just about everyone regards the characteristic values 
as good. 
To explore these issues, we adopt a distinctive approach. Instead of zeroing 
in on the concept ART in particular, we focus on the ways in which this one concept 
resembles or differs from concepts of other types. Accordingly, we conducted a 
series of studies examining people’s use of the concept ART along with 
a. a variety of concepts that had already been shown in previous studies either 
to have dual character (e.g., FRIEND) or not to have dual character (e.g., 
CATALOG) 
b. a variety of other art concepts (LITERATURE, BALLET, BREAKDANCING, etc.) 
which, we will argue, differ in that some have dual character and some do 
not 
If one looks just at the patterns in people’s application of ART, we acknowledge that a 
number of quite different hypotheses would be possible. However, we suggest that 
the full pattern observed across all of these concepts provides strong evidence in 
favor of our hypothesis that ART is dual character. 
 
4. Pretest 
 
We will be arguing that some art concepts, including ART, have dual character and 
others do not. As a first step in this argument, we need to assemble a list of art 
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concepts that we claim to have dual character and a list of art concepts that we claim 
not to have dual character. We construct these two lists using a simple pretest. 
The pretest borrows a method used to generate a list of non-art dual 
character concepts in Knobe et al. (2013). Participants were presented with twenty-
eight different art concepts (see Table 1) and, for each concept, asked to consider a 
brief dialogue. The dialogue is shown here with the concepts ART (the bolded and 
italicized texts are as shown to participants). 
 
Suppose that someone says: ‘That’s art.’ And now suppose that another 
person replies: 
 
I completely disagree. That’s not really art at all. In fact, if you think that it is 
really art, I would have to say that there is something fundamentally wrong 
with your values. 
 
Participants were then asked whether the second speaker’s talk about values made 
sense or whether this talk of values was just beside the point. To the degree that 
people thought that the reference to values made more sense for a given concept, we 
inferred that people saw the concept as involving a judgment with respect to the 
characteristic values criterion that is distinctive of dual character concepts.10 By 
contrast, to the degree that people thought that the reference to values made less 
sense, we inferred that people saw the concept as purely descriptive. We use this 
simple pretest to assemble the lists of concepts that will play a key role in our 
subsequent studies. 
  
4.1. Methods 
 
One hundred two participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk.11 All 
participants were presented with 28 art concepts in randomized order. The concepts 
were: ARCHITECTURE, ART, ARTWORK, BALLET, BREAKDANCING, COMIC, COMEDY, 
CONCEPTUAL ART, DOCUMENTARY, FICTION, FILM, HORROR, LIMERICK, LITERATURE, 
NON-FICTION, NOVEL, OPERA, PHOTOGRAPH, PLAY, PUNK, RAP, SCIENCE FICTION, 
SCULPTURE, SHORT STORY, SONNET, STREET ART, SUSPENSE, VIDEO GAME.  
 
                                               
10 A referee rightly notes that although the method used in this pretest makes it possible to distinguish between 
descriptive concepts and value-laden concepts, it does not by itself make it possible to distinguish between different 
types of value-laden concepts. In particular, this method does not make it possible to distinguish between dual 
character and thick concepts. This an important issue for further research, and difficult questions arise about 
whether the normativity involved in dual character concepts is the same as the normativity involved in thick 
concepts (Reuter 2019: 5–6). Hence, while for this pretest we follow the method of previous empirical work on dual 
character concepts, we also acknowledge the limitations of this method. Note, however, that in Study 2, we 
empirically demonstrate a difference between dual character concepts and concepts that have a positive evaluative 
component, such as MASTERPIECE and HERO, which are plausibly regarded as thick concepts. 
11 54.9% of participants self-identified as female. The mean age of participants was 34.79 years, with a standard 
deviation of 11.801. For all studies reported in this paper, we recruited from a pool of participants with registered 
location in the United States. Participants were paid market rate. See Paolacci and Chandler (2014) for an overview 
of the demographic characteristics of the Amazon Mechanical Turk participant pool, its validity for conducting 
social scientific research, and favorable data quality comparisons with traditional university lab studies. 
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For each concept, participants were presented with the dialogue described above. 
Participants were then asked whether the second speaker’s reply made sense or 
whether the reference to values here was just beside the point and made no sense. 
Ratings were recorded on a scale from 1 (‘doesn’t make sense’) to 7 (‘makes sense’).  
 
4.2. Results and Discussion 
 
The mean ratings for each concept are displayed in Table 1. As the table shows, there 
is great variation within art concepts in terms of the degree to which participants 
believe that their application has something to do with values. Participants clearly 
judged some art concepts, such as STREET ART and PUNK, to have some connection to 
values, but they judged other art concepts, such as LIMERICK and COMIC, not to 
involve such a connection. Importantly, the concept ART fell into the former 
category. 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
LIMERICK 2.48 1.739 
COMIC 2.54 1.645 
VIDEO GAME 2.60 1.842 
SONNET 2.63 1.734 
BREAKDANCING 2.75 1.784 
SHORT STORY 2.76 1.719 
ARCHITECTURE 2.89 1.823 
PLAY 3.03 1.821 
BALLET 3.03 1.771 
SUSPENSE 3.13 1.778 
SCULPTURE 3.18 1.869 
DOCUMENTARY 3.18 1.890 
NOVEL 3.18 1.853 
OPERA 3.20 1.851 
SCIENCE FICTION 3.23 1.845 
FILM 3.35 1.953 
RAP 3.35 1.933 
PHOTOGRAPHY 3.37 1.944 
FICTION 3.40 1.941 
PUNK 3.66 2.099 
NON-FICTION 3.66 2.056 
HORROR 3.66 1.827 
STREET ART 3.87 2.003 
ARTWORK 3.92 1.984 
CONCEPTUAL ART 3.96 1.980 
LITERATURE 4.15 1.895 
COMEDY 4.26 1.985 
ART 4.39 2.102 
 
Table 1. Means and standard deviations for concepts examined in the pretest. Italicization 
indicates that the concept was selected for further investigation in Study 1 and Study 2. 
 12 
Although the aim of this pretest was simply to generate stimuli that could be 
used in the subsequent studies, it is perhaps interesting in itself to see that some of 
these concepts are quite different from others. For example, why is it that 
LITERATURE scores more highly on this measure than ARCHITECTURE? One 
possibility would be that art concepts are more dual character when they are more 
subsumed under the concept ART. In other words, the concept LITERATURE seems to 
refer only to those works of fiction or poetry that embody certain artistic values. By 
contrast, the concept ARCHITECTURE is not reserved for buildings that embody 
artistic values but is instead applied more broadly to all buildings, regardless of the 
values they embody. Future research could explore these questions more directly, 
perhaps by randomly assigning participants to receive different art concepts that 
differ systematically just in certain specific properties. 
In the studies that follow, we took concepts with relatively high mean ratings 
as exemplars of dual character art concepts (ART, LITERATURE, CONCEPTUAL ART, 
STREET ART, PUNK), and concepts with relatively low mean ratings as exemplars of 
descriptive art concepts (ARCHITECTURE, SHORT STORY, BREAKDANCING, SONNET, 
COMIC). In what follows, we compare these different kinds of concepts to each other, 
and also to certain non-art concepts. 
 
5. Study 1 
 
One striking property of dual character concepts, as established in Knobe et al. 
(2013), is that people generally find it appropriate to use them in what we will call an 
ultimately-not sentence (illustrated here using the concept FRIEND): 
 
There is a sense in which she is clearly a friend, but ultimately, when you 
think about what it really means to be a friend, you would have to say that 
she is not a friend at all.  
 
By contrast, people usually do not regard such sentences as appropriate when used 
with non-dual character concepts (illustrated here using STROLLER): 
 
There is a sense in which that is clearly a stroller, but ultimately, when you 
think about what it really means to be a stroller, you would have to say that 
it is not a stroller at all. 
 
Our hypothesis now is that this same effect should arise within art concepts. 
Thus, we predict that the trademark reaction obtained for dual character concepts 
outside the domain of art (such as FRIEND) should also be regarded as appropriate 
for the art concepts picked out by our pretest as dual character (including the 
concept ART). People should therefore regard sentences like this one as appropriate:  
 
There is a sense in which that is clearly art, but ultimately, when you think 
about what it really means to be art, you would have to say that it is not art 
at all. 
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For this study, we compared four concept sets, which varied along two dimensions, 
concept domain (art vs. non-art) and concept type (dual character vs. descriptive), 
with four exemplars each:12 
• Art / Dual Character: ART, CONCEPTUAL ART, STREET ART, PUNK 
• Art / Descriptive: COMIC, SONNET, BREAKDANCING, ARCHITECTURE 
• Non-Art / Dual Character: FRIEND, CRIMINAL, MUSEUM, LOVE 
• Non-Art / Descriptive: CHAIR, STROLLER, OBITUARY, CATALOG 
For each concept, participants were presented with an ultimately-not sentence and 
asked to rate the sentence on a scale from ‘sounds weird’ to ‘sounds natural’. We 
predicted that the results for the art concepts would mirror the results for the non-
art concepts, showing the same basic distinction between dual character concepts 
and descriptive concepts. If we do obtain this result, it would provide evidence that 
the puzzling patterns of judgment associated with art concepts are best understood 
as instances of the same basic phenomenon that can be seen in people's use of non-
art dual character concepts. 
 
5.1. Methods 
 
Forty-nine participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk.13 Each 
participant was presented with all concepts, in randomized order, in a completely 
within-subject design. For each concept, participants were given an ultimately-not 
sentence. Participant responses to each sentence were then recorded on a scale from 
1 (‘sounds weird’) to 7 (‘sounds natural’). 
 
5.2. Results  
 
For each participant, we calculated the mean response for each concept set. The 
mean responses for each condition are displayed in Figure 1. As the figure shows, 
participants thought that the ultimately-not statement sounded more natural when 
applied to dual character concepts than when applied to descriptive concepts. 
Importantly, this pattern emerged not only for the non-art concepts (replicating 
previous results) but also for the art concepts. 
 Results were analyzed using a 2 (concept domain: art vs. non-art) x 2 
(concept type: dual character vs. descriptive) repeated-measures ANOVA. As 
predicted, there was a large main effect of concept type whereby dual character 
concepts received higher ratings than descriptive concepts, F(1, 48) = 98.734, p < 
                                               
12 The art concepts were selected partly on the basis of the pretest and partly on the basis of theoretical and 
pragmatic considerations. The non-art concepts were selected partly on the basis of the lists provided in Appendix A 
of Knobe et al. (2013) and partly on the basis of theoretical and pragmatic considerations. A referee rightly notes that 
it was actually the concept ART MUSEUM, instead of MUSEUM, that appeared in Knobe et al.’s (2013) list; but we made 
the modification to avoid confounding the art vs. non-art distinction between concept sets. Indeed, when we 
scrutinized the results further as prompted by the referee’s comment, we discovered that the mean rating of MUSEUM 
is the lowest of all non-art dual character concepts tested (but still higher than all non-art descriptive concepts 
tested). Perhaps this exploratory result suggests that the dual character property that Knobe and colleagues 
discovered is significantly attributable to the ART component of the concept, in keeping with our hypothesis. 
13 65.3% of participants self-identified as female. The mean age of participants was 34.06 years, with a standard 
deviation of 11.799.  100% self-identified as native English speakers. 
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0.001, η2P = 0.673. In addition, there was a small main effect of concept domain such 
that art concepts received higher ratings than non-art concepts, F(1, 48) = 9.517, p = 
0.003, η2P = 0.165, as well as a small but significant interaction between concept type 
and concept domain, F(1, 48) = 8.842, p = 0.005, η2P = 0.156. An inspection of the 
means showed that the interaction arose because the difference between dual 
character and descriptive concepts was greater for the non-art concepts. 
Nonetheless, pairwise comparisons between cells showed a significant effect for both 
types of concepts. Within non-art concepts, the dual character concepts (M = 5.03, 
SD = 0.945) received higher ratings than the descriptive concepts (M = 3.17, SD = 
1.250), t(48) = 9.832, p < 0.001, effect size r = 0.643.1 Similarly, within art concepts, 
the dual character concepts (M = 4.96, SD = 1.117) received higher ratings than the 
descriptive concepts (M = 3.77, SD = 1.121), t(48) = 6.188, p < 0.001, effect size r = 
0.469. 
 
 
Figure 1. Sinaplots of mean naturalness ratings of concept sets in Study 1. Colored points show 
the mean rating for each individual participant for each concept type. Grey circles show the 
overall mean for each concept type. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 Since we started this investigation by thinking about the nature of the 
concept ART, we examined more closely participant responses to an ultimately-not 
sentence with ‘art’. Participants agreed that the ultimately-not statement sounded 
natural when used with the word ‘art’ (giving it a mean rating of 5.39, with a 
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standard deviation of 1.57). This rating was significantly higher than the rating they 
gave on average to the descriptive art concepts, but it was not significantly different 
from the rating they gave on average to the dual character art concepts. In fact, it 
was, if anything, slightly higher than the rating given on average to the dual 
character art concepts, indicating that the concept ART very clearly showed the 
trademark dual character pattern in this study. A pairwise comparison did not show 
a statistically significant difference between ratings of ART and the average of 
participant ratings of non-art dual character concepts, t(48) = 1.771, p = 0.083. 
However, pairwise comparisons did show differences between ratings of ART and the 
average of ratings of descriptive art concepts, t(48) = 6.315, p < 0.001, effect size r = 
0.511, as well as between ratings of art and the average of ratings of descriptive non-
art concepts, t(48) = 8.830, p < 0.001, effect size r = 0.617. 
 
5.3. Discussion 
 
The results of the pretest enabled us to generate a list of exemplars for dual character 
art concepts and descriptive art concepts. In Study 1, we sought to demonstrate that 
the dual character art concepts we have identified exhibit a striking property of non-
art dual character concepts—namely, their appropriateness with ultimately-not 
sentences. Accordingly, we also sought to demonstrate that the descriptive art 
concepts we have identified do not exhibit the same striking property. 
Previous work had shown that participants were more inclined to regard the 
ultimately-not sentence as natural-sounding for dual character concepts than for 
descriptive concepts. This study showed that a closely parallel effect arises for art 
concepts. Participants are more inclined to regard the ultimately-not sentence as 
natural-sounding for the dual character concepts (e.g., PUNK) than for the 
descriptive concepts (e.g., BREAKDANCING). In particular, the concept ART clearly 
exhibits a striking property of dual character concepts.14 
Returning to the debate on the concept of art, this study suggests that there 
is something to our hypothesis. We found that ART and several art concepts were 
found to exhibit a striking property of dual character concepts. In the next study we 
set out to find further support for our claim that the dual character account of these 
concepts is correct. In particular, we wanted to provide more evidence that the 
descriptive, evaluative, and ambiguity approaches to these art concepts were 
mistaken.  
 
6. Study 2 
 
Remember that the notion of evaluation in the evaluative account and the ambiguity 
accounts is that of positive evaluation: to call a work ‘art’ is to express a positive 
evaluation of it. Again, to emphasize, the dual character account adopts a very 
                                               
14 In addition, this study also produced two other noteworthy results. First, we replicated the distinction between 
dual character and descriptive non-art concepts that Knobe et al. (2013) reported. Second, we found a small 
difference between art and non-art concepts that invites further investigation. 
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different notion of evaluation, on which to call a work ‘art’ is to say that it embodies 
the characteristic values of ART—regardless of whether it is good or not. 
In this study, we hypothesized that ART and other dual character art 
concepts that were identified in Study 1 and validated in Study 2 behave distinctly 
from clear cases of positive evaluative concepts, and distinctly from clear cases of 
descriptive concepts. If the results turn out as we hypothesized, then that is a 
powerful reason to think that ART is not evaluative, not descriptive, and not 
ambiguous between evaluative and descriptive. Instead, ART is dual character. 
For the descriptive concepts, we used the descriptive art concepts that were 
identified in Study 1. For the positive evaluative concepts, we chose concepts that 
standardly express a positive evaluation. For example, consider the concept 
MASTERPIECE. This concept unquestionably expresses a positive evaluation: whether 
a work is a masterpiece or not essentially depends on the degree to which it is good. 
If a work is not good, then it just cannot be a masterpiece. To call a work 
‘masterpiece’ is to say that it is good—indeed, that it is exceptionally good. 
We compared three concept types, with five exemplars each, as follows: 
• Dual Character: ART, CONCEPTUAL ART, STREET ART, PUNK, LITERATURE  
• Positive Evaluative: MASTERPIECE, STROKE OF GENIUS, HERO, SAINT, 
TRIUMPH15 
• Descriptive: COMIC, SONNET, BREAKDANCING, ARCHITECTURE, SHORT STORY 
For each concept, participants were presented with what we will call a not-good-but-
true sentence. These sentences took the following form (illustrated here using the 
concept ART): 
 
That is not good, but it is true art.  
 
Participants were then asked to rate the sentence on a scale from ‘sounds weird’ to 
‘sounds natural’. 
The hypothesis was that such sentences would sound relatively natural only 
with dual character concepts. With positive evaluative concepts, the first part of the 
sentence—‘that is not good’—would make the sentence sound internally 
contradictory. It standardly makes little sense to say that a work is ‘a masterpiece’ 
but at the same time that it is ‘not good’. To bring out the internal contradiction, we 
intentionally used the locution ‘that is not good’ simpliciter instead of, say, ‘that is 
not good art’ because we wanted ‘good’ to represent positive evaluation rather than, 
say, good-for-art. Similarly, with descriptive concepts, the second part of the 
sentence—‘but it is true…’—would also make the sentence sound relatively 
unnatural. This construction is licensed for dual character concepts, such as ‘true 
scientist’ and ‘true Christian’, but sounds wrong when used with concepts that do 
not have dual character, such as ‘true doorman’ and ‘true stroller’ (Knobe et al. 
2013).  
                                               
15 Note that not all the positive evaluative concepts are art concepts. On our view, besides MASTERPIECE and STROKE 
OF GENIUS, there are relatively few clear cases of positive evaluative art concepts. Since domain constancy is not 
essential for the result we are interested in, we decided to choose clear cases of positive evaluative concepts, even if 
they are not clearly art concepts. 
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Figure 2. Sinaplots of mean naturalness ratings of concept sets in Study 2. Colored points show 
the mean rating for each individual participant for each concept type. Grey circles show the 
overall mean for each concept type. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
6.1. Methods 
 
Fifty participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk.16 Each participant 
was presented with all concepts, in randomized order, in a completely within-subject 
design. For each concept, participants were given a not-good-but-true sentence. 
Participant responses to each sentence were then recorded on a scale from 1 (‘sounds 
weird’) to 7 (‘sounds natural’). 
 
6.2. Results 
 
The mean responses for each concept type are displayed in Figure 2. Overall, ratings 
for the not-good-but-true sentence with dual character concepts were significantly 
higher than ratings for positive evaluative concepts, and were also significantly 
higher than ratings for descriptive concepts. 
                                               
16 60.0% of participants self-identified as female. The mean age of participants was 32.06 years, with a standard 
deviation of 11.350. 100% self-identified as native English speakers.  
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 We began by conducting a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA. Mauchly’s 
test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effect 
of concept type: χ2(2) = 21.485, p < 0.001. Therefore, degrees of freedom were 
corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.752). The ANOVA 
showed a significant difference between the three concept types, F(1.504, 73.694) = 
9.665, p = 0.001, η2P = 0.165. Further tests revealed that participants gave higher 
ratings to not-good-but-true sentences with dual character concepts (M = 4.62, SD = 
1.333) than with either positive evaluative concepts (M = 4.01, SD = 1.595), t(49) = 
2.615, p = 0.012, effect size r = 0.204, or descriptive concepts (M = 3.81, SD = 1.146), 
t(49) = 6.315, p < 0.001, effect size r = 0.310. The effects detected in Study 2 are, as 
the statistics show, subtler than the effects detected in Study 1. 
 Again, given the starting point of our investigation, we examined ART more 
closely. Here again, this concept clearly showed the trademark dual character 
pattern. Participants rated the not-good-but-true statement as sounding natural 
when used with ‘art’ (mean rating of 4.92, with a standard deviation of 1.64). This 
rating is significantly higher than the rating for the average of the descriptive 
concepts and also significantly higher than the rating for the average of the 
evaluative concepts. Pairwise comparisons showed a difference between participant 
ratings for ART and the average of participant ratings of positive evaluative concepts, 
t(49) = 3.812, p < 0.001, effect size r = 0.130, as well as a difference between 
participant ratings for art and the average of participant ratings of descriptive 
concepts, t(49) = 5.875, p < 0.001, effect size r = 0.162. 
 
6.3. Discussion  
 
The aim of this study is to assess the dual character account of ART against its 
competitors. We hypothesized that ART and other dual character art concepts would 
behave differently from clear cases of positive evaluative concepts and clear cases of 
descriptive concepts. Specifically, we hypothesized that participants would be more 
inclined to regard the not-good-but-true sentence as natural when it was used with 
the dual character concepts than when it was used with either positive evaluative 
concepts or descriptive concepts.  
 The results confirmed our hypothesis. First, it is noteworthy in itself that 
people are willing to use phrases like ‘true art’ and ‘true punk’. Existing research 
suggests that willingness to use these phrases can serve as a test of whether a concept 
has dual character (Knobe et al., 2013), and these results therefore provide additional 
support for the claim that these are dual character concepts. Of course, it would 
always be possible to argue for some alternative explanation, but we find it hard to 
think of any alternative explanation that could make sense of the exact pattern of 
results obtained here. For example, one might think that the word ‘true’ could be 
used to indicate that something is a prototypical category member (so that, e.g., ‘true 
art’ would simply mean prototypical art), but it is hard to see how this hypothesis 
would make sense of people’s reluctance to use our true-but-not-good sentence with 
concepts like BREAKDANCING (since we can surely make sense of the notion of 
prototypical breakdancing). Pending further suggestions regarding alternative 
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hypotheses, we therefore take these results as evidence that ART is not a purely 
descriptive concept. 
 Second, participants thought that it did not sound internally contradictory 
to say, for example, ‘That is not good, but it is true art’.  Moreover, participants were 
significantly more willing to use these sentences with concepts like ART than they 
were with positive evaluative concepts like MASTERPIECE. This result indicates that 
ART and other similar art concepts (PUNK, STREET ART, etc.) are not merely used to 
express a positive evaluation.  
 Finally, it is implausible that ART and the other art concepts are merely 
ambiguous between descriptive and positively evaluative; since there is only one 
instance of the relevant concept involved in each not-good-but-true sentence, the 
ambiguity account would seem to predict that subjects would respond as if the 
concept was either positively evaluative or descriptive. As such, the dual character 
account better explains the structure of these accounts than competitors in the 
existing literature. 
 
7. General Discussion 
 
Before going further, let us summarize our experimental results. The pre-test and 
Study 1 gave us evidence that prominent art concepts such as ART function like other 
dual character concepts. Study 2 then gave us evidence that dual character art 
concepts do involve some kind of evaluation, but that this evaluation is not just a 
matter of assessing the degree to which a work is good. Taken together, these studies 
both affirm the existence of dual character art concepts and partially illuminate their 
structure.17  
If this is right, then we can gain a better understanding of certain art 
concepts by learning more general facts about dual character concepts. In particular, 
our suggestion is that ART exhibits the typical structure of dual character concepts 
because its application involves both a descriptive features criterion and a 
characteristic values criterion. Of course, we will not be able to address all theoretical 
questions about the concept of art. Specifically, we will not contribute to the debate 
about the exact content of its descriptive features criterion and its characteristic 
values criterion.18 However, in what follows, we do want to briefly explore ways in 
which research on art concepts—including ART—can benefit from the research on 
dual character concepts. 
 
                                               
17 Our empirical studies only address social kind art concepts, such as ART, but not social role art concepts, such as 
ARTIST. In this respect, our research differs from most extant research on dual concepts; indeed, Del Pinal and 
Reuter (2017: 477) contend that dual character concepts are ‘paradigmatically expressed by social kind terms.’ This 
difference raises multiple questions for future research. Do social kind and social role dual character concepts share 
the same conceptual structure? Or are there subtle differences between, say, type of normativity at play for ART and 
the type of normativity at play for ARTIST? Are the dual character status of related social kind and social role 
concepts independent? Or, for example, is ARTIST a dual character concept because ART is a dual character concept 
(or vice versa)? 
18 That is, we will not directly contribute to the debate on what art really is. As discussed at the start, it is plausible 
that our empirical theory of the folk concept of art can indirectly contribute to that debate as a constraint on or a pro 
tanto consideration for some theories of art. 
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7.1. Dual Character Concepts: Dichotomy or Continuum? 
 
In our initial presentation, we have been writing as though there were a simple 
dichotomy, such that some concepts do have dual character (e.g., LITERATURE) and 
others do not have dual character (e.g., COMICS). Yet the actual pattern of our 
experimental data reveals a more complex picture. As Walton (2007: 155) 
emphasized, ‘If we are to understand the thoughts and actions of the folk, we must 
characterize accurately the theories and concepts with which they are working, all 
warts included.’ In each of our studies, we do not find a clear division whereby some 
concepts receive very high ratings and others receive very low ratings. Instead, we 
always find a whole continuum of ratings, with many concepts receiving ratings at 
some intermediate level. How exactly is this pattern to be understood? 
To begin with, we should note a further fact about the pattern of our data. At 
least in principle, it would be possible for the mean rating of a concept to be 
intermediate even if no individual participant gave it an intermediate rating. (If half 
of the participants give it a high rating and the other half give it a low rating, the 
mean rating will be intermediate.) However, that is not what occurred in the present 
case. In Study 1, for example, the proportion of participants who choose the 
midpoint of the scale was greater than the proportion who choose either extreme 
point. Thus, the phenomenon to be explained is not pattern whereby different 
participants give different extreme responses but rather a pattern whereby many 
participants give intermediate responses. 
One possible explanation would be that the intermediate responses simply 
reflect uncertainty. Many participants presumably feel that they do not know very 
much about conceptual art, about street art, or about breakdancing, and they may 
therefore feel understandably reluctant to express definite opinions about these art 
forms. On this first explanation, people’s use of intermediate ratings is just an 
attempt to say something like: ‘I am not quite sure’. 
A second possible explanation would be that participants genuinely see 
certain categories as having an intermediate status. On this second explanation, the 
intermediate ratings are not an attempt to express uncertainty. Rather, they are an 
attempt to say something like: ‘This art form truly is intermediate between the two 
extremes’. 
Further research could explore more specific hypotheses about this 
intermediacy. Suppose we start out with the idea that whether a concept has dual 
character is determined by whether there is a characteristic value that the superficial 
features associated with the concept serve to realize. Plausibly, this approach would 
lead not to a dichotomy but rather to a continuum. At one extreme would be the 
case in which all of the superficial features are perfectly suited to realize a single 
characteristic value. At the other would be the case in which the features simply 
arose from random historical contingencies and do not realize any characteristic 
value in any way. But many actual concepts would lie between these extremes. There 
is no single characteristic value that all of the features serve to realize, but even so, 
some of the features serve, at least to some degree, to realize one or more abstract 
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values. One hypothesis worth exploring would be that people’s intuitions in such 
cases will themselves be intermediate.  
 
7.2. The Nature of Disagreements about Dual Character Concepts 
 
Since descriptive features standardly pick out and realize characteristic values, 
standard instantiations of dual character concepts satisfy both the descriptive 
features criterion and the characteristic values criterion. However, disagreements 
can arise when only one of the two criteria are satisfied and people disagree about 
which criterion to use. For example, suppose there were a person who exhibits skill 
at running experiments and publishing in scientific journals but also exhibits a lack 
of commitment to revise their beliefs in light of empirical evidence. There might be 
disagreements about whether this person is a scientist or not.  
Beyond this brief gloss, though, we are genuinely not sure about how to best 
characterize the nature of such disagreements. There are a few possibilities. 
Although we cannot yet determine which one is correct, we want to emphasize that 
all of these possibilities can explain such disagreements without appealing to 
implausibly uncharitable interpretations of one or more of the interlocutors. 
One possibility would be that people have a weighting on each of these sets 
of criteria (in a sense familiar from prototype theory) and that different people's 
weightings are slightly different. Thus, it might be that everyone thinks that the 
descriptive features criterion is relevant and that everyone thinks the characteristic 
values criterion is relevant but that different people assign different weights to these 
competing criteria. In such scenarios, different people may arrive at different 
conclusions about the same case. 
Another possibility would be that people think that different criteria are 
relevant in different contexts. There might then be certain contexts in which 
everyone agrees that the descriptive features criterion is relevant and others in which 
everyone agrees that the characteristic values criterion is relevant. However, there 
might also be contexts in which people have opposing views, with some people 
taking the descriptive features criterion to be relevant and others taking the 
characteristic values criterion to be relevant. In contexts of this type, different people 
may arrive at different conclusions about the same case.  
Finally, there may be people who genuinely have only one criterion while 
lacking the other entirely. On this view, certain individuals would show only partial 
grasp of the concept. The concept is characterized by two different criteria, but they 
have only grasped one. In scenarios that involve individuals with opposite partial 
grasps of the same concept, different people may arrive at different conclusions 
about the same case. 
Note that in all three cases, interlocutors might go on to engage in what 
Plunkett and Sundell (2013) have called ‘metalinguistic negotiation’ about how best 
to use the word associated with the concept in question; for example, metalinguistic 
use of the term ‘scientist’ in a debate about how to properly weigh the descriptive 
and values criteria associated with SCIENTIST. But if our hypothesis is right, 
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metalinguistic negotiation is not the whole story—the need for such negotiation 
arises precisely because of the dual character structure of the concept in question. 
 
7.3. Understanding Puzzling Conversations About Dual Character Art Concepts 
 
Recall Alfie and Betty’s conversation about art: 
 
Alfie:  This is not art. I know many people think it is art, but 
when you think about what art really is, you will realize 
that it is not art at all. 
Betty: Of course this is art. It is in the Los Angeles County 
Museum of Art! 
Alfie: I know. But it’s impersonal factory-produced rubbish. 
 
Here is our basic diagnosis of this conversation. ART is a dual character concept 
which combines descriptive criteria and a characteristic values criterion. Both Betty 
and Alfie are using the same dual character concept but focusing on different 
criteria. Betty is claiming that Michael Jackson and Bubbles is art on the basis of a 
descriptive feature of art: that it is exhibited in an art museum. However, Alfie is 
claiming that Michael Jackson and Bubbles is not art on the basis of some 
characteristic value of art—specifically, some value that implies that impersonal 
factory productions cannot be art.  
As we note above, this diagnosis can be made more nuanced by considering 
the different possibilities under which disagreements involving dual character 
concepts might arise: perhaps Alfie and Betty differentially weigh the criteria, 
perhaps this is a context that makes ambiguous which criterion is relevant, or 
perhaps Alfie and Betty each have opposite partial grasps of the concept ART. 
Regardless of the specifics, general facts about dual character concepts allow us to 
explain the conversation between Alfie and Betty without interpreting either 
uncharitably.19  
The diagnosis can also be made more nuanced by considering the 
intermediacy of people’s ratings.  Remember that our ultimate goal is to explain the 
fact that debates about artistic status are frequent or commonplace. The suggestion 
that ART exhibits an intermediate, but relatively high, dual-character rating is well-
suited to explain such a phenomenon. It explains why debates about artistic status 
are frequent but also gives us a way to understand why there are many contexts in 
which such debates do not occur.  
Remember that other accounts of ART diagnose the puzzling conversation 
uncharitably: each of them makes at least one conversant obviously mistaken. In 
contrast, on the dual character account of ART, it is a substantive and difficult 
question whether Michael Jackson and Bubbles is art because this is a non-standard 
case in which the descriptive features seem to fail to pick out and realize the 
                                               
19 Again, the conversation might also turn out to be an instance of metalinguistic negotiation about how the word 
‘art’ should be used. But we claim that it is the dual character nature of the art concept which leads to this 
metalinguistic negotiation. 
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characteristic values. So, in engaging in this conversation about whether Michael 
Jackson and Bubbles is art or not, Alfie and Betty are really asking substantive and 
difficult questions about the relationship between the descriptive features and 
characteristic values of the concept ART. And that, we think, is why such 
conversations about ART and similar art concepts remain commonplace.  
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